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A.: Criminal Law--Keeping Place of Prostitution--Circumstantial Evide
CAS9E COMMENTS
sale. State v. Board, 111 W. Va. 562, 16.3 S. E. 57 (1932). Though the
land was characterized as irredeemable, the former owner had one
later opportunity to redeem, redemption being allowed during the
pendency of the suit for the second sale. W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c.
37, art. 3, § 29. The court declared that this second period of redemption is a mere matter of grace on the part of the legislature
without effect on the irredeemable status of the land. Bank of Quiniwood v. Becker, 119 W. Va. 534, 194 S. E. 894 (1937). Also,
statutes extending the time allowed for redemption are constitutional, the extension being a legislative privilege that does not affect the
irredeemable quality of the land. Blooming Rose Coal Co. v. White,
37 S. B. (2d) 455 (W. Va. 1946). The same line of reasoning would
have sustained the statute in question. Thirdly, in point of fact. the
lands in the main case could not have been redeemed from 1929 until
1932 nor from 1939 until 1941. W. VA. CODE (Barnes, 1923) c. 31.
§ 33; IV. Va. Acts 1939, c. 61. This would seem sufficient to satisfy any technical requirement of irredeemability. Finally, the
court might have employed the technique it recently used in Lawhead v. County Court, 38 S. E. (2d) 897 (W. Va. 1946). There the
court went beyond the so-called plain meaning of the words to apply
their practical and rational meaning. The instant case turns upon
refinement of syntax rather than reason. Under it, had the statute
allowed one week, or even a day, during which there could be no redemption, it would have been valid. Such reasoning is hypercritical.
The constitution exhibits no purpose to restrict the legislature in the
matter of redemption; instead, its silence in this respect indicates,
and the court might have held, it was a matter whose details were
for the legislature. The decision flies in the face of the principle of
deciding constitutional doubts in favor of statutory validity.
R. G. S.

CRIMIIN-1L LA--KEEPING

STANTIAL EVIDENCE OF

PLACE OF

PROSTITUTION-CIRCUMI-

CorpusDelicti. - As X, an undercover man,

walked by the house occupied by D and two other women, he was accosted by D and asked to come in for the purpose of prostitution with
cne of the women. He inquired as to the price and was told that it
would be "all right". X then excused himself on a pretense and
left. Approximately two weeks later the house was raided and the
same two women, who were present when D solicited X, were arrested along with D. The evidence showed That D had a past record as
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a keeper of a place of prostitution; D admitted that she had been
arrested twice for that offense. It was adequately shown that the
house had a bad reputation for being a place of prostitution. One
of the women arrested with D remarked at the time of the arrest
that "she knew she could not get away with this forever and she expected a raid of this kind." D was convicted before a justice of the
peace for keeping a place of prostitution and appealed to the
criminal court, where there was a verdict of guilty and D was
sentenced to serve one year in jail and to pay a fine. The circuit
court refused to review the judgment of the criminal court and D
was granted a writ of error and supersedeas. Held, one judge dissenting, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury's
verdict of guilty since one instance of solicitation, the reputation
of the house, and the previous arrests of D for keeping a place of
prostitution do not. taken separately or collectively, prove the
corpus delicti. Conviction reversed. State v. Crummitt, 40 S. E.
(2d) 852 (W. Va. 1946).
To convict for the offense of keeping a place of prostitution, the
state must prove that the defendant kept the place and that the place
was one of prostitution. W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1943) § 36660. The
statute does not define "house of ill fame" or "place of prostitution" so the common law must be consulted for a definition. In
State v. Badda, 97 W. Va. 418, 125 S. E. 170 (1924), a bawdyhouse or house of ill fame is said to be "a house kept for the reception of persons who choose to resort to it for the purpose of illicit
sexual intercourse." Gamex-el v. State. 137 Ark. 74, 207 S. WV. 211
('1918) differed from the instauit case in that there was no
statute making the keeping of a place of prostitution an
offense, but resembled it in that the court was forced to resort to
I he common law for a definition of a place of prostitution. There,
where defendant operated a mercantile establishment and lived in
a room adjoining, and there was testimony that a lewd woman, frequently though not regularly, at defendant's place, was there for
immoral purposes, that defendant had solicited other men to have
intercourse with her there, and that men were seen to come and go
with her from the place, the evidence was held sufficient to prove the
existence of a place of prostitution. The varying facts in cases from
other states also tend to support a less explicit showing than was demanded in the instant case. In Cominonwealtht v. Visotsky, 129 Pa.
Super. 86, 195 Atl. 148 (1937), the court held evidence of defend-
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ant's general reputation, past raids on the house, and testimony of
ten police officers as to its reputation, sufficient to prove the existence of a place of prostitution. In State v. Johnson, 189 Minn. 546,
250 N. W. 366 (1933), which is summarily rejected by the majority
in the instant case, one instance of solicitation of a police officer
plus the general reputation of the house, of the inmates, and of defendant were held sufficient to prove the corpus delicti. In Commonwealth v. Levandowski, 90 Pa. Super. 403 (1927)., involving a
conviction for keeping a place of prostitution, the corpus delicti was
held adequately established where the house bore the reputation of
a bawdyhouse and there was evidence that defendant had furnished
one witness a girl whom he took upstairs and paid money, some of
which was turned over to defendant, that no fornication took place
and that same girl later solicited another witness to go upstairs with
her. As a general principle, the corpus delicti may be established
by circumstantial evidence, 2 BISHOP, NEw CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(2d ed. 1913) 1057, although when it is to be so established, the evidence must include all uncertainty from the minds of the jury.
State v. Bennzett, 93 W. Va. 548, 117 S. E. 371 (1923). It is not,
however, necessary that each particular circumstance be of this conclusive character, but the combined effect of all the circumstances
in the case must be such as to prove the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt. Patterson v. State, 202 Ala. 65, 79 So. 459 (1918) ;
State v. Davidson, 30 Vt. 126 (1858). But cf. State v. Bennett,
supra. Although no one circumstance in the instant case was sufficient to prove the corpus delicti, the real issue was whether all of
them in the aggregate were not sufficient to do so beyond a reasonable doubt. The most nearly analogous cases seem to support the
dissent.
G. R. A., JR.
DOwNM-PROPERTY SUBJECT TO RIGHT-CONTRACT BEFORE MAR-

WILL TO ANOTHER. -Before decree in a pending divorce
proceeding. H undertook by a written contract with W to continue
to furnish W and their two children their present residence as a
home, to supply necessaries, and pay an annuity as long as W remained unmarried, and that upon his death all his net estate should
be divided equally between W and the children, in return for TV's
surrender of alimony claims and property settlement. The contract
was recorded and divorce granted. H having remarried, plaintiff,
RIAGE TO
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